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ABSTRACT 
This contribution is aimed at drawing attention to the fact 
that at present the most widely accepted understanding of the 
origins of modern behaviour is dominated by Western con-
cepts of the character of humanity. Here, it is briefly dis-
cussed that this understanding not only produces less than 
convincing results in the current discussion on ‘modern hu-
man origins’, but is still plagued by problems that were al-
ready evident in the 18th and 19th centuries. It is suggested 
that these issues are connected to a simplistic and essentialist 
understanding of human historical development. The concept 
of ‘modernity’ inevitably produces a version of human histo-
ry that is unilinear, eurocentric and concentrates on the de-
velopment and history of state societies. It is therefore sug-
gested that 'modernity' in all its versions is counterproductive 
to our aim of understanding the human past and present. It 
needs to be replaced by an understanding of organisms, hu-
mans and their environments as mutually constituting each 
other and as products of their situated becoming and not of 
their essential (cognitive and/or genetic) and timeless quali-
ties.  
INTRODUCTION 
In this short contribution I want to draw attention to some 
problematic issues connected with the current and most wide-
ly accepted understanding of the origins of modern behaviour 
or behavioural modernity. I want to use some aspects of the 
long and complex Australian history to draw attention to the 
fact that the discussion surrounding these issues is guided by 
Western values and definitions of humanity and modernity. I 
want to stress at the beginning that this essay is not intended 
to provide an exhaustive discussion of the issues mentioned. 
In particular, it will not be able to provide clear solutions to 
the problems discussed. This will, in any case, not be an easy 
task, because it will involve rethinking some fundamental 
assumptions about the character of history and evolution. The 
view from Australia is especially instructive in this context, 
because it allows the questioning of  essentialist orientations 
and implied core-periphery distinctions in the current under-
standing of the origin of modern behaviour. 
Following prominent authors such as Paul Mellars (e.g. 
2006, 2007), Christopher Henshilwood (e.g. 2007) and Rich-
ard Klein (e.g. 2000, 2008, 2009), the ‗human revolution‘ – 
the origin of behavioural modernity – is currently supposed 
to have happened between ca. 45,000 and 80,000 years ago in 
Africa. Although Mellars (2007:3) emphasizes that descrip-
tions of differences between European Middle and Upper 
Palaeolithic technologies were ―never intended or presented 
as any kind of global characterization of ‗modern‘ behaviour-
al patterns across Europe as a whole, let alone on a more con-
tinental scale‖, he uses exactly these traits to identify the crit-
ical period for the development of modern behaviour in Afri-
ca. These traits (―blade‖ production, end-scrapers, burins, 
geometric lithic elements relating to multi-component hafted 
tools, appearance of increased imposed form and style, rela-
tively complex bone tools, use of perforated shells and orna-
ments, the use of ochre etc.) are supposed to have enabled the 
―closely ensuing Out-of-Africa dispersal, and the rapid colo-
nization of the rest of the world‖ (Mellars 2007:8) shortly 
after 80,000 and 60,000 years ago. 
From an Australian perspective, it is interesting to note 
that most of those innovations that supposedly enabled mod-
ern humans to reach this continent are conspicuously rare in 
the region during the Pleistocene. Although Mellars (2007:4) 
is aware of the European legacy that is included in the defini-
tion of modern behaviour, he chooses not to abandon it. This 
view leaves not only the earliest settlers of Australia in an 
awkward position, but also African and Near Eastern anatom-
ically modern humans associated with evidence for ritual 
behaviour but without Upper Palaeolithic material culture, 
such as the Herto specimens in Ethiopia (Clark et al. 2003) or 
the individuals at Skhul and Qafzeh, Israel (Vanhaeren et al. 
2006). What is the cognitive status of these individuals who 
are dated between 100,000 and 160,000 years ago? Accord-
ing to the view that there was a ―revolution‖ inhuman behav-







Archaeology/Centre for Rock-Art Studies, School of Social and Cultural Studies, University of Western Australia; 
martin.porr@uwa.edu.au 
BULLETIN OF THE INDO-PACIFIC PREHISTORY ASSOCIATION 30, 2010 
29 
iour between 80,000 and 45,000 years ago, they cannot have 
been modern. Henshilwood (2007) elaborates on this inter-
pretation in the context of his discussion of ―fully symbolic 
Sapiens behaviour‖. The inclusion of the term fully here sig-
nals the need to distinguish this concept from supposedly 
lesser or only half-symbolic individuals and populations. 
According to Henshilwood (2007:123) ―modern human be-
haviour‖ or ―fully symbolic sapiens behaviour‖ was ―likely 
closely linked to the emergence of anatomically modern Ho-
mo sapiens at c. 200 kya‖ ago. However, he also states that 
―the change to anatomical modernity may not have been ac-
companied by behaviour that was mediated by symbolism 
although it could be argued that the capacity for this behav-
iour was already in place‖ (Henshilwood 2007:123). Further-
more, Henshilwood (2007:124) argues that to be 
―symbolically literate‖ is a ―defining factor of full behaviour-
al modernity‖. However, this ―literacy‖ is immediately un-
dermined because, in fact, ―it is the use of symbolism to me-
diate behaviour that is paramount and not symbolic thought 
alone or the capacity for symbolism‖ (Henshilwood 2007:124 
[emphasis added]). Consequently, the individuals mentioned 
above are imagined to have been in possession of the mental 
capabilities of later humans, but they were also somehow 
unable to express these abilities. 
In recent years, Richard Klein has been most prominent 
in arguing for a late and sudden appearance of modern hu-
man behaviour between 45,000 and 50,000 years ago. His 
view is that around this time ―a fortuitous mutation 
[occurred] that promoted the fully modern brain‖ (Klein 
2008:271). The development of the modern brain and the 
modern mind enabled hominins to spread all over the Old 
World (and eventually into the New World) and to replace all 
other archaic populations. 
One would think that the current understanding of the 
Palaeolithic record of both Southeast Asia and Sahul would 
provide serious challenges to this understanding. However, 
Klein (2008:271) argues that the record from East and South-
east Asia ―is slim and poorly dated‖ and therefore cannot be 
used to refute his model, while the record from Sahul is re-
garded as supporting his model, because ―conspicuous ar-
chaeological change occurred 50-40 ka‖ ago in this region 
(Klein 2008:271). Since no further discussion of this claim is 
provided, it is very difficult to comprehend how a singular 
and localized event, such as a mutation in a single organism 
in East Africa, could have produced the global distribution of 
modern humans, the accompanying material culture and so-
cio-economic/adaptive relationships within the time frame 
that Klein proposes. This is, in fact, demonstrated by Klein 
(2008:270) himself in the form of a map showing the 
―hypothetical routes of modern human dispersal from Afri-
ca‖. Modern humans had virtually no time whatsoever to get 
used to their new ways of thinking and reach Sahul as the 
dates for the origins of modern behaviour in Eastern Africa 
and the arrival in Australia seem to be almost indistinguisha-
ble. 
These problems are connected to a definition of humani-
ty and an understanding of human development that is firmly 
based on fundamental elements of the Western tradition of 
thought. Tim Ingold (e.g. 1995, 2000, 2002b) has repeatedly 
stressed that ideas about human origins in archaeology and 
palaeoanthropology reflect a highly restricted understanding 
of biological evolution that reduces biological developments 
to genetics and constructs a clear distinction between biologi-
cal and historical developments. This reduction almost inevi-
tably leads to the idea that ‗behavioural modernity must have 
a genetic basis and was therefore created at a particular point 
in time through a mutation event. The most important ele-
ments of the Upper Palaeolithic record and the qualities that 
reflect typical Western values (e.g. emphasis on innovation, 
efficiency, expansion, advances in the extraction of energy 
from the environment etc.) appeared at this moment. This 
understanding can be seen as an extension of the traditional 
Western essentialist definition of humanity (or behavioural 
modernity) that has deep roots in European intellectual histo-
ry, including a Platonian/Cartesian separation of the body and 
the mind that is remodelled into the idea of a separation be-
tween ‗anatomical modernity‘ and ‗behavioural modernity‘. 
The current view of modern human origins consequently 
very much rests on the idea of an absolute and qualitative 
distinction between modern humans and other hominins, and, 
consequently, animals (Ingold 2002b). This is, of course, 
only possible by concentrating exclusively on cognitive and 
mental attributes with a genetic basis. This essentialist orien-
tation shows extensive similarities with the Western 
―metaphysical and religious tradition that was dogmatically 
certain that all those born of women housed immortal souls 
that were equipped to share God‘s life‖ (Clark 1988:31). Alt-
hough the religious connotations have generally disappeared, 
the structure of the argument remains very similar. The belief 
in a human soul finds its modern expression in the belief in a 
genetic endowment that is shared by the whole human spe-
cies (McBrearty & Brooks 2000:533). 
Ingold (2004) has drawn attention to the fact that already 
Darwin and his contemporaries were struggling with the is-
sues of genetic endowment and cognitive abilities. Darwin 
himself was very clear about the fact that he assumed that 
differences between human populations were a product of 
their organic heritage, their genetic basis. Human history was 
consequently seen as a selection process in which ―‗tribes 
have supplanted other tribes‖‘, which favoured groups with 
the larger proportion of ―‗well-endowed men‖‘ (Darwin 1874 
cited in Ingold 2004:211). The success of these human popu-
lations was, however, not measured by their abilities to adapt 
to local environments and conditions, but in relation to an 
absolute scale of human achievements, which was defined by 
and only fully realized in modern Western society. In com-
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bining his views of the general processes of biological evolu-
tion with a view of human history that was fundamentally 
teleological, Darwin produced not only a view of human evo-
lution that was deeply racist. It was also plagued by the deep 
contradiction between the processes of local adaptation and 
supposed universal and absolute human progress. Further-
more, some contemporaries of Darwin were also already 
aware of the complex cultural achievements of supposedly 
primitive or less-developed people. One of these thinkers was 
Alfred Wallace, who concluded that it was impossible that 
biological evolutionary processes alone could have 
―‗endowed savage man with a brain … very little inferior to 
that of a philosopher‘‖ (Wallace 1870:356 quoted in Ingold 
2004:212).  
These problems have not so much to do with the as-
sumed powerful but unrealized capabilities of early modern 
brains. Rather, the paradox itself is only a product of retro-
spectively defining what ‗modern behaviour‘ actually is and 
its imposition onto the archaeological record. The normal 
course of history, the one that is supposed to accurately re-
flect the real capacities of the modern mind, is consequently 
the course that was taken by the most complex and sophisti-
cated societies, those who have achieved the stage of 
―theoretic thought and external symbolic storage‖ (as defined 
and developed by Donald 1991). The whole argument, how-
ever, is nothing but the logical consequence of following an 
essentialist Western understanding of humanity that locates 
the essence of humanity in the cognitive abilities of the mind, 
which are modelled upon the core values of the modern 
Western world. 
This emphasis on those aspects of cognition geared to-
wards innovation and growing social, organisational and 
technological complexity almost inevitably produces a ver-
sion of human history that is unilinear, eurocentric and con-
centrates on the development and history of state societies. 
As such, it has a long history in Western intellectual tradi-
tion. In fact, the current standard model of modern human 
origins seems to reproduce a version of human history that is 
virtually indistinguishable from ideas expressed by 18th cen-
tury Enlightenment theorists. These proposed a 'psychic unity 
of mankind', where all human beings shared "a common set 
of basic intellectual capacities, and in that sense may be con-
sidered equal" (Ingold 2004:211). In Linnaeus' Systema Natu-
rae, published in 1735, the genus Homo is placed within the 
classification of animals, "but distinguished by the injunction 
Nosce te ipsum, 'know for yourself'" (Ingold 2002b:27). The 
implication is that even though humans are a part of the ani-
mal kingdom, the essential qualities of a human can be found 
in its mind. History was regarded as "the story of man's rise 
from primitive savagery to modern science and civilisation" 
and ―the idea that human reason would rise and eventually 
triumph over the brute forces of nature was the centrepiece of 
their philosophy" (Ingold 2004:210-211). Humans were seen 
to be different: 
in degree from other creatures with regard to their ana-
tomical form, but nevertheless were distinguished in 
kind from the rest of the animal kingdom in so far as 
they had been endowed with minds - that is with the ca-
pacities of reason, imagination and language - which 
could undergo their own historical development within 
the framework of a constant bodily form (Ingold 
2004:211). 
This is exactly the position that is at the heart of some of 
the most influential contributions to the current discussion 
about the so-called origins of modern humans and behaviour-
al modernity. This position cannot be accommodated within 
traditional Darwinian evolutionary thinking today as it could 
not in the 19th century. Given the anti-evolutionary character 
of this view of humanity, it is not surprising that most authors 
do not attempt to reconstruct the moment or the conditions of 
the ―magic moment‖ that created either fully modern humans 
or modern humans endowed with the capacities for fully 
modern behaviour. It is very difficult to imagine this revolu-
tionary transition that created the abilities that enabled our 
ancestors to transcend the laws of biological evolution and 
embark upon conquering the world with its different and 
challenging environments—a moment "without precedent in 
the evolution of life‖ (Ingold 2004:212-213). 
Darwin himself proposed that the differences between 
societies have to be related to genetic differences and he did 
not propose one magic moment, which turned our ancestors 
into fully modern human beings (Ingold 2004:211). But just 
as current thinkers have rejected this version of human devel-
opment with its racist implications, they have inherited the 
problem of creating a version of human history that is divid-
ed into two phases that are characterized by a set of qualita-
tively different causalities: "There is one process, of evolu-
tion, leading from our ape-like ancestors to human beings 
that are recognisably of the same kind as ourselves; another 
process, of culture or history, leading from humanity's primi-
tive past to modern science and civilisation" (Ingold 
2004:212).  
In this way, current thinkers have inherited the ethnocen-
trism that characterised this thinking. In most current con-
cepts there is indeed very little space for any variability in the 
characteristics of modern humans. In fact, the ones that are 
presented appear as nothing else than a reflection of the val-
ues and categories of Western modernity, which are assumed 
to universally underlie and guide the behaviour of all human 
beings. This view does not take into account the numerous 
ways that people relate to their environment and the ways 
that they see and construct themselves. It rather universalizes 
one particular historical and intellectual trajectory and 
"privileges as supremely 'human' the cultural categories of 
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the investigator" (Tapper 1988:59). These categories are pro-
jected back in time and traced in the form of 'origins re-
search' (Gamble & Gittens 2004). It is rarely conceded that 
the categories themselves are a product of a specific histori-
cal trajectory and therefore would have to be subjected to a 
contextual analysis. It is clear that they carry numerous 
"common-sense presumptions that nature is an objective giv-
en, and further, that humanity is one, a species with a com-
mon nature despite cultural diversity‖, however, ―it has long 
been established that notions of both nature and humanity are 
highly variable and changing cultural constructions, and that 
in many societies they are not constructed at all" (Tapper 
1988:49). It is rather arrogant to assume that all cultural vari-
ations are just noise and disturbances obscuring a universal, 
genetically fixed substrate supposedly geared towards West-
ern efficiency considerations and purely accessible through 
Western scientific, analytical thought. 
In this brief contribution, it is not possible to show in 
great detail how this general orientation has influenced the 
perception and interpretation of the archaeological record of 
Sahul and Australian Indigenous people. However, it seems 
clear that neither has featured in models of human evolution 
or history as fully developed human societies. Even before 
the beginnings of scholarly anthropology and with virtually 
no knowledge of the life-ways and history of its Indigenous 
people, Australia was perceived as the crucial anthropologi-
cal ―laboratory‖ for understanding the original condition of 
humanity. As Kuper (1988:92) has pointed out, this view was 
purely based on the observation that Australian Aborigines 
―were black, naked hunters and gatherers‖. In this, they pre-
sented the appropriate antithesis to northwestern European 
societies within a generalizing, unilinear and progressive 
understanding of human history. The geographical distance 
between these societies further supported the idea of progres-
sive, central regions that had to be distinguished from stag-
nant, peripheral regions of human social development 
(Gamble 1992).  
The study of Australian Aboriginal societies and their 
past was therefore not conducted to understand how these 
societies organised their relationships with each other and 
their environments. The main aim was to find the original 
condition of humanity, which was primarily constructed in a 
binary fashion in opposition to European state societies. 
Kuper (1988) has provided a classic critique of the idea of 
primitive society and the fallacies connected with it. It is in-
teresting to note that in the 19th century, primitive society was 
primarily defined not along economic parameters (i.e. hunt-
ing and gathering), but rather along social or even religious 
ones (e.g. kinship). Australian ‗totemism‘ played here a cru-
cial role in the formative period of social anthropology (see 
Kuper 1988:92-104). The Man the Hunter conference and its 
proceedings (Lee & DeVore 1968) are generally regarded to 
have provided the shift within hunter-gatherer studies to-
wards an emphasis on ecological, scientific and materialistic 
approaches. They have not, however, changed the basic ori-
entation of hunter-gatherer studies as research into the origi-
nal state of humanity. The conference crystallized a shift in 
attitude towards what constitutes the essential characteristic 
of hunter-gatherers and, by extension, the original condition 
of mankind. Recent and prehistoric hunter-gatherers were 
studied subsequently within an ecological-evolutionary 
framework that had close theoretical links with neo-
Darwinian biology. In an interesting but conceptually flawed 
extension (see Ingold 2000:27-39), this orientation also in-
corporates classic economic thinking with an emphasis on 
cost-benefit decision making (see also Lee & DeVore 
1968:21). As mentioned above, the attitude towards the value 
of the study of hunting and gathering people has not changed 
with this shift. This is aptly illustrated by the promotional sub
-title to the Man the Hunter conference volume that reads: 
―the first intensive survey of a single, crucial stage of human 
development—man’s once universal hunting way of life” Lee 
and DeVore 1968. Now hunter-gatherers are supposed to 
represent a crucial stage in human development, because they 
exemplify a state of human existence that is not only defined 
by their subsistence activities, but because they appear to be 
as close to nature as possible and therefore close to the myth-
ical point of the origin of humanity. 
The ecological and materialistic orientation of most 
hunter-gatherer studies produces research designs that almost 
exclusively concentrate on quantifiable data and exclude a 
serious engagement with Indigenous interpretations and 
viewpoints. For example, in neither Kelly‘s (1995) The For-
aging Spectrum nor Binford‘s (2001) monumental Construct-
ing Frames of Reference is any direct statement by a hunting 
and gathering person included. Consequently, no engagement 
with these viewpoints is possible. Culture and cultural goals 
are seen as distractions and distortions. Indigenous perspec-
tives are perceived as secondary and irrelevant as causal ele-
ments in the understanding and explaining of behaviour and 
material culture. One might argue that these approaches are 
partly directed at analysing archaeological and prehistoric 
cases, where no access to indigenous perspectives is possible. 
However, as I tried to show above, the problem is more fun-
damental than this. In general, these approaches present a 
highly selective and impoverished view of hunting and gath-
ering people and, by linking it to an equally selective and 
impoverished view of biology, they create the impression of 
universal applicability. In a sense, they therefore also use and 
propagate an impoverished version of humans and organisms 
in general. 
The Australian colonial and post-colonial experience, in 
contrast, shows that reality is much richer and more complex 
than any attempt at explaining human existence as a conse-
quence of genetic mutation, selection processes or cost-
benefit calculations could accommodate. Acknowledging this 
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does not mean that these elements do not contribute to human 
actions, but they need to be placed in their specific context in 
a non-essentialist manner—into dialectical processes of 
growth and development. Altogether this will mean that it 
cannot be assumed that deep within every human being can 
be found a core of attributes that are unaffected and apart 
from the circumstances of the relational development of or-
ganisms in their environments and exclusively accessible 
through Western analytical methods. This will also mean that 
we have to abandon the search for the origins of modern hu-
mans or behavioural modernity altogether. The idea as such 
will inevitably lead to the generalisation of a particular his-
torical experience at the expense of spatio-temporal varia-
tions. Modernity in all its versions is not only a slippery con-
cept, but counterproductive to our aim of understanding the 
human past and present. 
It is clear that the development of alternative methodo-
logical approaches and theoretical frameworks is not a trivial 
matter. It has to involve a reflexive and fundamental critique 
of a large number of deeply ingrained concepts about per-
sons, organisms, and processes of tradition, learning, heredity 
and the relationships between animals and humans and their 
environment (e.g Antweiler 1991, Bird-David 1999, Gamble 
& Porr 2005, McBrearty 2007). Most importantly, this also 
has to involve a critical re-assessment of the relevance of 
evolutionary biology in its present neo-Darwinian form. In-
deed, some within the field of evolutionary biology have al-
ready moved in this direction, proposing a truly relational 
view of development that breaks down the distinctions be-
tween evolution and history, and sees humans, animals and 
their environments as mutually constituting each other (e.g. 
Jablonka & Lamb 2005, Ingold 1991, 1998, Lewontin 2000, 
Oyama et al. 2001). Furthermore, it appears quite significant 
that despite the dominance of genetics and neo-Darwinian 
models in many discussions about human evolutionary pro-
cesses, biology itself has already moved into the ‗post-
genomic era‘ (see e.g. Sarkar & Plutynski 2008, Rosenberg 
& Arp 2010). In palaeoanthropology and Palaeolithic archae-
ology, these developments still have to be integrated into 
models of human evolution. 
The relational character of some of these approaches and 
frameworks show some interesting convergences with non-
Western and indigenous ontologies and epistemologies, 
which open up new exciting avenues of exploration beyond 
explicit and implicit attempts to fit indigenous experience 
and life-ways into the Western scientific or academic frame-
work of knowledge and discourse (Bell & Porr in prep.). In 
this spirit, Australia‘s past and present has a lot to offer. In-
gold (1991:356) observed almost twenty years ago that 
adopting a non-essentialist epistemology involves ―taking 
seriously what many non-Western peoples (...) have been 
trying to tell us for some time‖.  
Senior Ngarinyin lawman David Mowaljarlai expressed 
exactly the same view only a few years later, in 1995:  
What we see is, all the white people that were born in 
this country and they are missing the things that came 
from us mob, and we want to try and share it. And the 
people were born in this country, in law country, from all 
these sacred places in the earth. And they were born on 
top of that. And that, we call wunggud – very precious. 
That is where their spirit come from. That's why we can't 
divide one another, we want to share our gift, that every-
body is belongin; we want to share together in the future 
for other generations to live on. You know? That's why 
it's very important (quoted in Bell 2009:164). 
 Archaeological and anthropological research has to en-
gage crtitcally with its own historical and epistemological 
foundations. It has yet to fully engage with the (Australian) 
indigenous experience in its own right. This still remains the 
most important lesson from Sahul. 
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